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Network Capacity Constraints∗
He´le`ne Le Cadre† Anthony Papavasiliou Yves Smeers‡
Abstract
In this article, we provide a new methodology for optimizing a port-
folio of wind farms within a market environment, for two Market Designs
(exogenous prices and endogenous prices). Our model is built on an agent
based representation of suppliers and generators interacting in a certain
number of geographic demand markets, organized as two tiered systems.
Assuming rational expectation of the agents with respect to the outcome
of the real-time market, suppliers take forward positions, which act as
signals in the day-ahead market, to compensate for the uncertainty asso-
ciated with supply and demand. Then, generators optimize their bilateral
trades with the generators in the other markets. The Nash Equilibria
resulting from this Signaling Game are characterized using Game Theory.
The Markowitz Frontier, containing the set of efficient wind farm port-
folios, is derived theoretically as a function of the number of wind farms
and of their concentration. Finally, using a case study of France, Germany
and Belgium, we simulate the Markowitz Frontier contour in the expected
cost-risk plane.
Keywords: Game Theory; Market Design; Renewable Capacity Investment;
Markowitz Frontier.
1 Introduction
Market Coupling is the most advanced Market Design in the restructuring of
the European (EU) electricity market. Market Coupling is the current outcome
of a long and possibly never ending process towards an integrated electricity
market [8]. The path towards Market Coupling developed from an initially
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very decentralized view of an electricity market that only cared for access to the
grid; development towards centralization then came as one progressively became
aware of the very particular need for coordination required by electricity. Mar-
ket Coupling takes some of these requirements into account but still remains far
from the central organization that drives the United States (US) Independent
System Operator (ISO) system. Market Coupling indeed relies on a separation
of the energy market (organized by Power Exchanges) and transmission ser-
vices (congestion and grid support services) operated by Transmission System
Operators (TSOs). As several other electricity markets, Market Coupling is a
two tiered system with a day-ahead market followed by a real-time market or,
more exactly, a balancing system. The system is zonal in the sense that the
European (EU) market is decomposed into zones (often, but not always, cor-
responding to countries) where Kirchhoff’s laws are ignored and it is assumed
that there is no congestion. Power Exchanges operate in national markets and a
special supra national organization clears the global energy market on the basis
of the bids submitted to the national Power Exchange and a representation of
the grid coming from the TSOs [41].
Our work can be related to two streams of previous work. The first stream
of literature is that related to the application of stochastic programming mod-
els to the electricity markets. Because events can always occur between day
ahead and real time, the TSO can encounter in real time network difficulties
that have not been anticipated in the day ahead. This phenomenon is enhanced
in Market Coupling because market clearing in the day ahead uses an imper-
fect representation of the grid. In their paper, Smeers et al. [30] assessed the
amount of counter trading that might arise in real time as a result of using
an approximate description of the grid in the day ahead. This problem takes
a further dimension with wind penetration as wind forecast remains imperfect
and any market clearing based on such forecasts in the day ahead is bound
to be in imbalance in real time. The issue was examined in Oggioni et al.
[24] under strong assumptions of perfect coordination among TSOs to organize
counter trading. In both cases, the work compared the result of a stylized rep-
resentation of Market Coupling with an equally stylized representation of nodal
pricing. Our second stream for inspiration comes from the computer systems
literature [21]. In their model, Nair et al. explicitly characterized the impact
of growing wind power penetration on electricity market design by optimizing
the placement of an intermediate market between the day ahead and real time,
assuming supply and demand balance each other [21]. The originality of their
model stemmed from its capability to derive closed form expressions for the
optimal energy procurement strategy by making the analogy with a variant of
the well-known newsvendor problem.
Market Coupling is considered as a major achievement on the path to inter-
nal energy market; its progress has been discussed at length in EU circles such
as the Regulatory Forum in Florence. Surprisingly the literature and in par-
ticular the formalized literature on the subject has remained relatively limited
in contrast for instance with the extensive literature in the US nodal pricing
system [23].
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Our model extends the approach of Nair et al. by introducing competi-
tion among the geographic demand markets subject to Market Coupling and
characterizing the optimal investment policy in renewable energy supply capac-
ity, which is becoming a major consideration for utilities that are subject to
aggressive renewable portfolio standards.
Accurate short-term forecasts of wind farm power output over the next few
hours to days are important factors for secure and low cost operations of power
systems with high wind power penetration [20], [25]. According to Girard et
al. [7], it is difficult to quantify the economic benefit of improved forecasting.
The recent literature dealing with the placement of wind turbines concludes
that the aggregation of wind farms can produce significant effects in terms of
variability and cost reduction [7] since forecast errors might compensate each
other. Furthermore, a portfolio of wind farms is likely to give better results in
terms of the trade-off between cost and profit and its variability than relying on
a single wind farm [9]. Considering both problems of wind farm expansion and
optimal wind farm portfolio generation, Girard et al. checked, using real data
from Western Denmark, that power generator revenue is linear with respect to
the wind farm capacity factor and that the accuracy of short-term wind power
forecasts has only a very small impact on revenue. However, as the authors
explained, their results do not quantify the benefit of predictability from a global
system point of view. Adopting a more systemic approach, Green showed, using
18 years of hourly wind speed data coming from 120 sites around Great Britain,
that careful market analysis is needed if investors are to build optimal portfolios
of wind stations [9]. Baringo and Conejo already made the link, dealing with
the optimization of a strategic wind power investor who sells wind power in a
two tiered market (including a day-ahead and a balancing market) [1].
The main contribution of our work is an analytical treatment of the strate-
gic positioning of suppliers in two tiered electricity markets, where real-time
conditions are dictated by the uncertainty of renewable energy supply. A by-
product of this analysis is the characterization of the optimal investment policy
in renewable energy supply capacity, for suppliers acting as investors in wind
power.
According to the literature mentioned above, a careful (simplified) modeling
of Market Coupling is the most crucial modeling aspect. We consider a cer-
tain number of geographic demand markets, described in Section 2. Since we
want to characterize the agents’ general behaviors, we do not consider explicitly
Kirchhoff’s laws and aggregate the supply and the demand at the market level.
The originality of our approach relies on its capability to cope with competition
among suppliers that are operating in spatially separated electricity markets,
which was ignored in the previously cited models. After having defined the
agents’ roles in Subsection 2.1, we assume that a Signaling Game occurs over
each geographic demand market in the day ahead. Its timing is described in
Subsection 2.2. The link between day-ahead and real-time markets is guaran-
teed by the existence of a forward position in the day-ahead energy market that
compensates for the uncertainty of supply and demand in real time. The Game
is solved for two Market Designs: two tiered with exogenous prices in Section 3
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and two tiered with endogenous prices in Section 4. Efficient wind farm port-
folios are then characterized on the basis of the Markowitz Frontier definition.
Its exploration is detailed in Section 5. Contrary to traditional approaches that
ignore the occurrence of rare events when performing risk minimization, the
Markowitz Frontier is defined in a context of rare events, guaranteeing the ro-
bustness of the wind farm distribution. Illustrations based on real wind speed
and energy consumption data for France, Germany and Belgium are provided
in Section 6.
Specific notation and modeling assumptions
Parameters:
tf Day-ahead market time of occurrence
t0 Real-time market time of occurrence
N Number of geographic demand markets
κi,j Equivalent capacity between markets i and j
Probability density functions:
Γ(a) Gamma function evaluated in a
Γinc(a, x) Incomplete Gamma function evaluated in a, x
N (0;σ2) Gaussian density function centered in 0
and of standard deviation σ
Market i setting:
pf Day-ahead price for one unit of conventional energy
p0i Real-time price for one unit of conventional energyCi Market i cluster set
p˜0i Compensation tariff for wind over-supply
Ui Supplier expected cost
Πi Conventional generator expected profit
sfi Supply of conventional in the day ahead
s0i Supply of conventional in real time
cfi marginal cost of conventional at tf
c0i marginal cost of conventional at t0
afi , b
f
i marginal cost parameters at tf
a0i , b
0
i marginal cost parameters at t0
qfi market i demand of conventional at tf
q0i market i demand of conventional at t0
q˜0i market i over-supply of wind production at t0
ri Day-ahead position
αi Average wind production of a single wind farm
γi Number of wind farms
θi Concentration of the wind farms
λfi→j Bilateral trade between market i and j at tf
λ0i→j Bilateral trade between market i and j at t0
Λi Sum of market i trades in real time (energy balance)
Λ+i Sum of market i exports in real time
di Market i total demand in real time
dˆi Day-ahead forecast of market i total demand
νi Forecast error made on the demand prediction
σνi Demand forecast error standard deviation
wi Wind power produced in real time
wˆi Day-ahead forecast of wind power production
i Forecast error on wind power prediction
∆i Difference between wind power and demand forecast errors
σi Wind power forecast error standard deviation
σ∆i Forecast error difference standard deviation
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˜i Forecast error on a single wind farm
σ˜i Single farm forecast error standard deviation
F¯∆i Complementary cumulative distribution function associated with ∆i
Normality of the deviations:
νi ∼ N
(
0; (σνi )
2
)
i ∼ N
(
0; (σi )
2
)
˜i ∼ N
(
0; (σ˜i )
2
)
∆i ∼ N
(
0;σ2∆i
)
∆i is independent of any ∆j , ∀j = 1, ..., N, j 6= i
Strategic wind capacity investment problem:
T Investment problem horizon
I(i, T ) Market i supplier investment function
ξ construction cost for a single wind farm
Ξ construction cost for the wind farm portfolio
RV ar(i, T ) Market i supplier risk
Market modeling simplifications:
• Balancing is offered by a different set of technologies than those used in the day-ahead
market, as a proxy of the existing practice in Europe where the energy power exchange
(administered by the power exchange operator) is separated from the operation of the
balancing market (administered by TSOs).
• We invoke rational expectation of suppliers and generators with respect to the outcome
of the real-time market, which implies that agents correctly anticipate the congestion
patterns of the real-time market. This is an extension of the usual assumption of
stochastic programming to a game context. In other words, first stage decisions are
optimal with respect to the outcome that they influence. Suppliers then anticipate
the outcome of the market (this does not imply anticipating the realization of demand
and wind supply, which is inherently uncertain and cannot be inferred by rationality),
and since line congestion in real time is an outcome of the market, suppliers are able
of predicting real-time congestion patterns and optimally adapting their day-ahead
strategy. Conventional generators are subject to market power in each stage: they are
subject to the strategic decisions of suppliers.
• We assume, in our paper, that in the balancing phase, excess wind is compensated by
a feed-in-tariff1; whereas under-supply is penalized at the real-time price, higher than
the compensation price. This is an extreme case of a monotone kinked deviation price
where agents are charged more for a shortage than they are remunerated for excess
supply. This form of balancing penalty is common in European balancing systems [19],
[40]. Although the exact closed form solutions depend on this choice of penalty, the
qualitative results (existence of an equilibrium) extend beyond this particular case.
2 The market model
We consider suppliers (distributors or utility companies) with long term con-
tracts for renewable energy. Given such a long term contract, the suppliers
participate in a two tiered market for conventional energy production. It con-
sists of a day-ahead market occurring at tf > 0 and of a real-time market,
occurring at t0 > tf ; meaning that t0 occurs after tf . It is worth mention-
ing that we do not address bilateral forward contracting but adopt a standard
assumption in the literature focusing on two-settlement systems [1], [19].
In the European Union (EU), the real-time markets introduced in this article
can be assimilated to the EU balancing system [7], [14] where positive and neg-
ative deviations are treated asymmetrically. Positive deviations are reimbursed
on the basis of a fixed tariff by excess unit, supposed smaller than the real-time
1The Feed-in-tariff, http://www.uswitch.com/solar-panels/guides/feed-in-tariff/
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price (this can be compared with the so called feed-in-tariff), whereas negative
deviations pay the real-time price as in Nair et al. model [21]. This reflects an
uninstructed deviation penalty for discouraging an unscheduled over-supply of
renewable power in real time, and is consistent with existing market practices.
Asymmetric settlements of real-time deviations have also been modeled in the
literature [19], [21], [27].
Our model is based on the assumption that competition is pure and perfect
within each geographic demand market in the day ahead and in real time. That
is why we assume throughout the article that offer equals demand (and also,
price equals marginal cost). Furthermore, we invoke rational expectation in
order to argue that agents correctly anticipate the congestion of a certain set of
lines.
Inside the economic system formed by the power markets, bilateral trades
occur among the markets. We let λfi→j (resp. λ
0
i→j) be the bilaterally traded
flow of energy between market i and market j in the day-ahead market (resp.
real-time market). A negative sign indicates an import from j to i, whereas a
positive sign indicates an export from i to j. Throughout the article, we will
use the simplifying notations: Λi ,
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j , Λ
+
i ,
∑
j 6=i(λ
0
i→j)+ and the
following conventions: (x)+ , max{x; 0} and (x)− , max{−x; 0},∀x ∈ R.
Market Coupling clears energy and transmission in the day ahead with an
”implicit auction” of transmission capacity [10], [22], and is followed by intra-
day trading and real-time balancing. Commonly, markets having smaller prices
export to markets having higher prices, until a common price is reached or
congestion occurs due to limited Available Transmission Capacities at the in-
terconnections [6], [13], [30]. Congestion management remains a controversial
issue in the restructured European electricity sector. Congestion occurs when
the infrastructure constrains transactions, thereby influencing the long term
evolution of generation and consumption [6].
Figure 1: Stylized representation of three split geographic demand markets: France,
Belgium and Germany, with their associated TSOs.
Our network model is based on a virtual representation of the European area
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where each node coincides with a geographic2 demand market containing one or
more TSOs and is fully interconnected with other geographic demand markets.
We give an illustration of this representation in Figure 1 for three geographic
demand markets (N = 3). Inside each demand market, the balancing markets
(managed by the TSOs) are coupled whereas they are split with the N−1 other
demand markets. We introduce the following definition: geographic demand
markets are coupled in real time if, and only if, their real-time prices coincide
i.e., no congestion occurs in real time3. Otherwise, they are said to be split. We
introduce the equivalent interconnection capacity between market i and market
j: κi,j ∈ R such that κi,j < +∞, i 6= j. According to Hutcheon and Bialek’s
representation of the European system [11], for any i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j, κi,j can
be either positive or negative; furthermore, we have the relation: κi,j = −κj,i.
We assume that all agents correctly anticipate the congestion of a certain set of
lines leading to a virtual representation of the European area in N split demand
markets. Such an anticipation has already been done by Borenstein et al. in
[4] for two geographic markets sharing a constrained transmission line. As a
by-product of congestion anticipation, for any couple of demand markets, real-
time trade equals equivalent interconnection capacity minus day-ahead trade
i.e., λ0i→j = κi,j − λfi→j ,∀i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j.
2.1 The agents
There is a certain number of geographic demand markets, each characterized
by a price insensitive4 and random demand. Only forecasts of the demand are
available in the day ahead and the true values of the demand (i.e., its realiza-
tions) are revealed in real time. Similarly, wind generation in each geographic
market is price insensitive and random: only forecasts are available in the day
ahead and the true values (i.e., the random variables realizations) are revealed
in real time. We now describe the different categories of agents interacting in
each demand market.
• Suppliers (distributors or utility companies) deliver energy to consumers
characterized by their aggregated demand. They are price takers in the
first Market Design (MD 1) detailed in Section 3. In contrast with stan-
dard assumptions, they are not price takers in the second Market Design
(MD 2), described in Section 4. In this latter Market Design, they are
aware that their decisions modify prices and take that knowledge into ac-
count to minimize their procurement cost. Since consumers are exposed
to a retail price that is unrelated to wholesale market conditions, we as-
sume an inelastic consumer demand whose real-time level is uncertain in
the day-ahead time frame. Additionally, we assume that the suppliers are
2The term ”geographic” will be understood in the rest of the article.
3The case of uncongested markets in real time is studied in [15].
4We do not consider demand side management in the present article. Models dealing with
decentralized demand response integration through distributed learning approaches can be
found in [14]. In [16], the end user’s demand is price responsive and storage is possible either
at the end users’ level, or at the microgrid aggregator level.
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driven by renewable portfolio standards to invest in renewable capacity.
Suppliers have to decide how to compose an optimal wind farm portfolio
for participating in the electricity market.
• Conventional energy generators are characterized by their supply function.
There is conventional generation in each market. Marginal costs are higher
in real time than in the day ahead for a given output level. We assume
that generators do not exercise market power, and suppliers buy electricity
at marginal cost.
2.2 A Signaling Game
We make the assumption that a clearing price is reached at tf . Because the
transfers are limited by the equivalent interconnection capacity, it will be harder
to align the market prices at t0.
We now describe the optimization program faced by each market. Over each
market i, at time instant tf :
(i) The suppliers optimize independently and simultaneously their pur-
chase of conventional energy so as to minimize their expected cost while
ensuring that the total purchased quantity satisfies the residual demand.
(ii) Anticipating what will happen in the real time market i.e., at time
instant t0, the conventional generators optimize independently and simul-
taneously the bilateral trades with the other markets so as to maximize
their expected profit under equivalent capacity constraints.
Under congestion anticipation of all the equivalent interconnection capacities,
the trades at tf are linked to the optimal trades at t0 according to the relation:
λfi→j = κi,j − λ0i→j ,∀i, j, i 6= j. The distributed optimization of the program
described above gives rise to a game belonging to the family of Signaling Games
[31]. Here the signal is based on the suppliers’ forward positions which can
be expressed as mappings of the suppliers’ wind and demand forecasts of the
underlying state of the system (unknown in the day ahead): (wi, di)i=1,...,N .
The bilevel game described above is solved by backward induction: we start
by optimizing the generator’s bilateral trades, assuming that the suppliers’ for-
ward positions are fixed. Then, the supplier’s expected cost are optimized by
derivating their utility with respect to their purchase of conventional energy.
2.3 Description of the markets
Market i is defined by:
• di, the end users’ total demand of energy at time t0. It satisfies the
relation: di = dˆi − νi where dˆi is the forecast made at tf of the end users’
total demand of energy at t0. νi is a random variable, representing the
forecast error made on the demand prediction, and distributed according
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to a Gaussian density function centered in 0 and of standard deviation σνi :
νi ∼ N
(
0; (σνi )
2
)
.
• wi, the energy produced at time t0 by the market renewable energy gen-
erators. It satisfies the relation: wi = wˆi − i where wˆi is the forecast
made at tf of the quantity of renewable energy that market i generator
will produce at t0. i is a random variable, representing the forecast error
made on the prediction of the renewable production, distributed according
to a Gaussian density function centered in 0 and of standard deviation σi :
i ∼ N
(
0; (σi )
2
)
. The forecast error on the production of a single wind
farm will be denoted ˜i. Being consistent with the assumption made on
i generation, it is distributed according to a Gaussian density function
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centered in 0 and of standard deviation σ˜i : ˜i ∼ N
(
0; (σ˜i )
2
)
. The relation
between i and ˜i will be discussed explicitly in Subsection 2.5.
• The forecast error vector for wind production and demand:
(
˜i νi
)T
6 is
also supposed to be a Gaussian random vector. According to Sinden [29],
wind power output in the United Kingdom (UK) has a weak positive corre-
lation to current electricity demand patterns i.e., E[˜iνi]σνi σ˜i
> 07. This implies
that ∆i , i−νi, which is the difference between renewable production and
demand forecast errors, is distributed according to a Gaussian distribu-
tion function centered in 0 and of variance σ2∆i = (σ

i )
2− 2E[iνi] + (σνi )2.
In the rest of the article, we will let: ∆i ∼ f∆i ≡ N (0;σ2∆i); F¯∆i will
represent the associated complementary cumulative distribution function.
∆i is supposed to be independent of any ∆j ,∀j = 1, ..., N, j 6= i i.e., the
prediction errors made on one geographic market are independent of the
ones made on the other geographic markets.
• sfi (resp. s0i ) market i supply of conventional energy in day-ahead (resp.
real-time) markets.
• cfi (sfi ) = afi + bfi sfi (resp. c0i (s0i ) = a0i + b0i s0i ) the marginal cost function
of conventional energy produced by market i and purchased at tf (resp.
t0), with a
0
i > a
f
i > 0 and b
0
i > b
f
i > 0 guaranteeing that the marginal
cost on the real-time market remains larger than in the day-ahead mar-
ket for a given output level. Indeed, balancing is often supplied from
machines that are reserved on a long-term basis, and these are the older
machines. The two supply curves are then different because they come
from different machines. If so, the current formulation that separates
5Other density functions might be considered without adding any changes in the derived
theoretical results except in the numerical illustrations where the Gaussian assumption greatly
simplified the computations.
6.T stands for the transpose of the vector.
7Data analysis ran on 66 onshore weather recording sites for the period 1970− 2003 in the
UK showed a correlation of 0.28 [29]. This is the value that we will use in the simulations.
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day-ahead and real-time machines, the latter having a higher marginal
cost than the former, may be seen as a simplification made to preserve
analytical tractability but is also in line with EU type systems where there
is separated fleets of capacity for balancing and for the day-ahead market.
Balancing capacity is contracted one year in advance [37], [38], [39], [40].
In addition, since the balancing market is pay-as-bid there is anyways no
way of empirically verifying or refuting whether strong links between day-
ahead market and balancing system exist. Our modeling approach is an
alternative that facilitates the development of our analysis and approx-
imates non-convexities associated with real-time operations such as the
wear and tear of machinery in emergency operation (emergency start up
costs, wear due to emergency ramping, etc.).
• qfi (resp. q0i ) market i demand of conventional energy in day-ahead (resp.
real-time) markets.
The amounts of conventional energy purchased by market i at tf and at t0
are defined as follows: qfi =
(
dˆi− wˆi + ri
)
+
and q0i =
(
di−wi− qfi
)
+
where ri
is a position in the day-ahead (lower cost) market. This day-ahead position is
determined by the energy supplier in market i for the consumers’ demand di to
be satisfied at t0 at the lowest possible cost; taking into account the uncertainty
of supply at t0. Market i knows dˆi and wˆi. Hence it is equivalent for the supplier
to determine qfi or ri. The hypothesis that q
f
i > 0 holds as long as the demand
exceeds the average wind capacity8. In the rest of the article, we will assume
that: qfi , dˆi − wˆi + ri. The over-supply of wind production in real time is
defined as: q˜0i = (∆i − ri)−. Depending on the market mechanism, excess wind
supply can be:
• Curtailed and compensated based on a feed-in-tariff. However, feed-in-
tariffs are highly controversial and many countries wish that renewable
energy generators directly participate to the market [26], [28]. We focus
on this mechanism in this article.
• Bought by hydro-power generators and stored in their Energy Transfer
by Pumping Stations. Hydro-power generators will re-inject extra supply
later into the system in case of peak demand. This mechanism would re-
quire to introduce dynamicity in the agents’ decisions and explicitly model
the storage capabilities of the hydro-power generators. It is therefore out
of the scope of this article.
• Re-injected into the system. If the ramp down of conventional generators
(especially, gas and coal) is not committed in the day ahead (the start up
costs being so high that the generators prefer producing power in excess
8It is sufficient to impose an upper-bound on the degree of wind penetration that we
consider i.e., dˆi+ri
αi
> γi, to ensure that this inequality holds.
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than turning off their units), negative prices might appear. This mech-
anism is also out of the scope of this article because it would require to
explicitly model the unit-commitment and the start-up cost of the con-
ventional generators.
2.4 Suppliers’ expected cost and generators’ expected prof-
its
We let pf be the day-ahead price, p0i be market i real-time price and p˜
0
i < p
0
i ,
the compensation price in case of excess wind. We define Ui, as the expected
cost at tf , that the supplier has to pay for its end user energy consumption.
The supplier is penalized paying the real-time price per missing unit and is
compensated on the basis of p˜0i per wind unit in excess [27]:
Ui = q
f
i p
f + E
[
q0i p
0
i − q˜0i p˜0i
]
(1)
We let Πi be the expected profit at tf of market i conventional energy
generator. It is defined as the difference between the price paid by all the
markets for the purchase of conventional energy and the cost of the energy. We
assume that all the supply is sold at each time. Then:
Πi = s
f
i p
f −
∫ sfi
0
cfi (s)ds+ E
[∑
j 6=i
(λ0i→j)+p
0
j
]
+ E
[(
s0i −
∑
j 6=i
(λ0i→j)+
)
p0i
]
− E
[ ∫ s0i
0
c0i (s)ds
]
(2)
2.5 Renewable energy modeling
The renewable wind energy production of market i is a function of the number
of wind farms and of their concentration which is characterized by their spatial
distribution over market i geographic area. To determine the renewable energy
procurement for market i, we use the model of Nair et al. [21]. For market i,
we introduce:
• αi, the average wind production of a single wind farm over the geographic
area of market i.
• γi, the number of wind farms over market i geographic area.
• θi ∈ [ 12 ; 1] (resp. 1 − θi ∈ [0; 12 ]), a constant capturing the concentration
(resp. the scattering) of the wind farm locations over market i geographic
area. The more (resp. the less) concentration, the more (resp. the less)
correlation there is between the wind farm productions.
We suppose that, at tf , αi is the best forecast of wind energy procurement
of a wind farm [21]. Then: wˆi(γi) = αiγi. The forecast error will depend
11
on the wind farm concentration too, and we choose the coefficient θi so that
i(γi) = γ
θi
i ˜i where ˜i, as already introduced, represents the forecast error for
the production of a single wind farm. We propose the following interpretation
for the scaling of θi: If the wind farms are co-located they will all produce the
same quantity of energy at the same time i.e., their productions are strongly
correlated. This is the case when θi = 1. This implies in turn that: i = γi˜i and
that: wˆi = wi + γi˜i. On the contrary, if they are spatially distributed so that
their productions are independent from one another i.e., uncorrelated, and under
the assumption that the forecast errors are distributed according to Gaussian
distribution functions, the Central Limit Theorem tells us that: σi =
√
γiσ˜

i
[21]. Therefore, the wind farm productions are independent from one another if,
and only if, θi =
1
2 . Note that in case of more general forecast error distribution
functions, it can be interpreted as an approximation for γi large enough. Finally,
in case where θi ∈] 12 ; 1[, the wind farms are randomly located over the market
geographic area and their spatial distribution is intermediate between perfect
independence and co-location. With these notations, we obtain:
wi(γi) = wˆi(γi)− i(γi) = αiγi − γθii ˜i
σi (γi) = γ
θi
i σ˜

i
i(γi) = γ
θi
i ˜i
In the rest of the article, for the sake of simplicity, the dependence of wi, σ

i and
i on γi will be omitted.
In the following sections, we solve the Signaling Game described in Subsec-
tion 2.2 for two Market Designs.
3 MD 1: two tiered with exogenous prices
In this first Market Design, the prices are supposed exogenous and such that:
0 < pf < p0i ,∀i = 1, ..., N
Going backwards, we start with Step (ii) in the bilevel game described in
Subsection 2.2. Derivating market i generator’s expected profit with respect to
λ0i→j and assuming that λ
0
i→j ≥ 0, we obtain: ∂Πi∂λ0i→j = −p
f +afi + b
f
i
(
dˆi− wˆi +
ri +
∑
k κi,k − Λi
)
+ p0j − a0i − b0iE
[
(∆i − ri)+ + Λi
]
. We will now prove that
market i generator’s optimal trades with the other markets is either zero or is
reached at the saturation of the equivalent capacities.
Reasoning by contradiction, if there exists a λ0i→j ≥ 0 such that ∂Πi∂λ0i→j = 0,
this would mean that p0j can be expressed exclusively as a function of market i
parameters. Suppose that there exists another market k 6= j and k 6= i such that
λ0i→k ≥ 0, then necessarily, p0k and p0j should coincide. But, by assumption, real-
time prices in different geographic demand markets do not coincide. Therefore,
if there are more than two geographic demand markets, the maximum of Πi is
reached at one boundary i.e., either λ0i→j = 0 or λ
0
i→j = κi,j .
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We now turn to Step (i) in the bilevel game described in Subsection 2.2.
Market i supplier’s expected cost takes the form:
Ui = q
f
i p
f + E
[
q0i p
0
i − q˜0i p˜0i
]
= (dˆi − wˆi + ri)pf + p0iE
[
(∆i − ri)+
]
− p˜0iE
[
(∆i − ri)−
]
We solve Step (i) of the optimization Program described in Subsection 2.2.
In Step (i), each market i supplier determines independently and simultaneously
the quantity of energy to purchase, qfi , or, equivalently, its day-ahead position,
ri, so as to minimize its expected procurement cost:
min
ri
Ui (3)
The decision variable ri is in fact defined on a smaller space than the real
coordinate space. Indeed, we need to have ri ≥ 0 since otherwise this means
that a supplier could be short in the day ahead, something that one may find
unrealistic given that conventional plants are more expensive in real time.
Derivating market i expected cost with respect to ri, we obtain:
∂Ui
∂ri
=(
pf − p˜0i
)
−
(
p0i − p˜0i
)
∂
∂ri
E
[
∆i− ri|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
=
(
pf − p˜0i
)
−
(
p0i − p˜0i
)
F¯∆i(ri).
Then:
∂Ui
∂ri
|ri=r∗i = 0⇔ r∗i = F¯−1∆i
(pf − p˜0i
p0i − p˜0i
)
(4)
Since ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
= (p0i − p˜0i )f∆i(ri) > 0, it coincides with a minimum for Ui. Fur-
thermore, market i’s optimal position being independent of the other markets’
optimal positions, Equation (4) leads to a unique Nash Equilibrium for the
market positions.
4 MD 2: two tiered with endogenous prices
In the following subsections, we derive analytically the endogenous prices in the
day-ahead and in the real-time markets.
The global day-ahead market is characterized by the equilibrium between the
supply and the demand: qftot(N) =
∑
i=1,...,N
qfi =
∑
i=1,...,N
sfi which is the global
quantity of conventional energy exchanged on day-ahead markets. Furthermore,
for any market i, we suppose, at t0, that the difference between the supply
and the demand for conventional energy in market i coincides with the sum of
bilateral trades with the other markets:∑
j=1,...,N,j 6=i
λ0i→j = s
0
i − q0i ⇔ Λi = s0i − q0i (5)
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We make the assumption that the prices pf and p0i paid by market i suppliers
for the energy purchased at tf and t0 respectively equal the marginal costs.
This assumption is justified in Subsection 2.3 by the decoupling of the cost
functions at the day-ahead and real-time markets and the assumption of perfect
competition which holds within each geographic demand market. In two-stage
market models, represented by stochastic programming, such an assumption
does not hold [27]. There are two major reasons why we do not work with a two
stage stochastic program at the generation side. One is the analytical character
of our work. Our model assumes suppliers that obey a two-stage optimization
paradigm with market power. Adding generators that also solve a two-stage
optimization problem and finding the equilibrium between the suppliers and
these generators is not amenable to an analytical solution. But, we also believe
that this additional technical complexity would bring little in terms of realism in
the EU context where the day-ahead market and the balancing are quite different
systems that can in no way be modeled or approximated by two-stage stochastic
program. The 2013 Survey on Ancillary Services Procurement and Electricity
Balancing Market Design by ENTSO-E [36] shows that there is no relation in EU
mind between what takes place in the energy market and in balancing. The maps
contained in [36] also show that quite different systems can prevail in neighboring
countries that are part of the Market Coupling, with the consequence that it
is simply unrealistic to formulate the coupling of the day ahead and real time
as a stochastic program. This separation is in fact our justification for our
modeling of the system as two separate markets. It implies that: pfi = c
f
i (s
f
i )
and p0i = c
0
i (s
0
i ). Furthermore, we assume that a clearing price is reached at
tf i.e., p
f
i = p
f
j , pf ,∀i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j meaning that all the markets are
integrated in a single one at that time. Because the transfers are limited by the
available transmission capacities, it will be harder to align the market prices at
t0: if the markets clear then p
0
i = p
0
j , p0,∀i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j; otherwise there
exists at least one market i ∈ {1, ..., N} in which the supplier pays p0i 6= p0j for j ∈
{1, ..., N} and j 6= i. This raises a combinatorial problem since all the possible
combinations of split/coupled markets should be included in the model. But,
the number of countries involved in the Central Western Europe area is currently
limited to 6 (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany and Italy
since February 2015). Therefore, the number of combinations of split/coupled
markets remains reasonable.
4.1 Derivation of the coupling price
We set: Af ,
∑
i=1,...,N
afi
bfi
> 0 and Bf ,
∑
i=1,...,N
1
bfi
> 0.
Lemma 1. The coupling price for the day-ahead market is: pf =
∑
i=1,...,N
qfi +A
f
Bf
.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the assumption of the supply and demand equi-
14
librium guaranteed by the day-ahead market rules, we have:
qftot(N) =
∑
i=1,...,N
qfi =
∑
i=1,...,N
sfi
=
∑
i=1,...,N
pfi − afi
bfi
under the assumption that pfi = c
f
i .
=
∑
i=1,...,N
pf − afi
bfi
since the N markets are coupled at tf .
= pf
( ∑
i=1,...,N
1
bfi
)
−
∑
i=1,...,N
afi
bfi
We infer from the following equations the day-ahead price on the coupling zone.
4.2 Derivation of the split market prices
We set: A0i ,
a0i
b0i
> 0 and B0i ,
1
b0i
> 0. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we infer
the real-time price on the i-th split market:
Lemma 2. The N markets being split in N geographic areas, at time t0, market
i price for the real-time market is: p0i =
q0i+A
0
i+
[ ∑
j=1,...,N,j 6=i
λ0i→j
]
B0i
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Using the real-time market rules defined through Equa-
tion (5), we have: q0i = s
0
i−
∑
j=1,...,N,j 6=i
λ0i→j . This implies that: q
0
i+
∑
j=1,...,N,j 6=i
λ0i→j =
p0i
1
b0i
− a
0
i
b0i
using the fact that c0i = p
0
i . Then: p
0
i =
q0i+
a0i
b0
i
+
[ ∑
j=1,...,N,j 6=i
λ0i→j
]
1
b0
i
=
q0i+A
0
i+
[ ∑
j=1,...,N,j 6=i
λ0i→j
]
B0i
by definition of A0i and B
0
i .
Day-ahead and real-time prices being now determined analytically, we let
r−i be a N − 1 dimensional vector containing the day-ahead positions of all the
suppliers except market i supplier.
Proposition 3. The sum of the bilateral trades of market i in the real-time
market, Λi, can be expressed as a linear function in ri and r−i.
Proof of Proposition 3. By definition: qfi = −
∑
j 6=i λ
f
i→j + s
f
i and p
f =
afi + b
f
i s
f
i . This implies, in turn, that:
∑
j 6=i λ
f
i→j = q
f
i − sfi and sfi = p
f−afi
bfi
.
This implies that:
∑
j 6=i λ
f
i→j = q
f
i − p
f−afi
bfi
= qfi −
∑
j q
f
j +A
f
Bf bfi
+
afi
bfi
using the
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definition of pf obtained in Lemma 1. Then, under congestion anticipation:∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j =
∑
j 6=i κi,j −
∑
j 6=i λ
f
i→j =
∑
j 6=i κi,j − (qfi −
∑
j q
f
j +A
f
Bf bfi
+
afi
bfi
) =
( 1
Bf bfi
−1)(dˆi−wˆi+ri)+ 1Bf bfi
∑
j 6=i(dˆj−wˆj+rj)+
∑
j 6=i κi,j− 1bfi (a
f
i − A
f
Bf
).
This means that there exists a linear function ϕi : RN+ → R such that
Λi = ϕi(ri, r−i).
As a corollary of Proposition 3, we obtain: ∂Λi∂ri =
∂
∂ri
(
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j) =
1
Bf bfi
−1
and ∂Λi∂rj =
1
Bf bfi
,∀j 6= i.
4.3 Solving the Signaling Game
The Signaling Game assumes that the supplier substitutes the day-ahead and
real-time prices with linear functions of ri and r−i (this was proved in Propo-
sition 3), and optimizes with respect to ri, given r−i. Day-ahead positions and
bilateral trades cannot be derived analytically since, as we will see, it is in-
tractable to inverse the complementary cumulative distribution function F¯∆i in
the fixed point equation defining the Nash Equilibrium in the day-ahead posi-
tions9. However, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence and unique-
ness of a Nash Equilibrium for the day-ahead positions and detail algorithmi-
cally how day-ahead positions and bilateral trades at the optimum should be
computed.
4.3.1 Optimization of the bilateral trades
Assuming that the agents correctly anticipate the congestion of the lines, we
observe that the supplies of conventional energy on day-ahead and real-time
markets can be expressed as functions of the bilateral trades in real time: sfi =∑
j 6=i λ
f
i→j +q
f
i =
(∑
j 6=i κi,j−Λi
)
+
(
dˆi− wˆi+ri
)
and s0i =
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j +q
0
i =
Λi +
(
∆i − ri
)
+
.
Proposition 4. The optimal bilateral trade between market i and any market
j 6= i can be expressed as a linear function in rj, r−j,
(
E
[
(∆k − rk)+
])
k|p0i<p0k
and E
[
(∆j − rj)+
]
.
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting sfi and s
0
i described above in the con-
9Except for simple distribution functions such as the Uniform density function.
16
ventional energy generators’ expected profit given in Equation (2), we obtain:
Πi =
(
dˆi − wˆi + ri +
∑
j 6=i
κi,j − Λi
) 1
Bf
(∑
j
(dˆj − wˆj + rj) +Af
)
− afi
(
dˆi − wˆi + ri +
∑
j 6=i
κi,j − Λi
)
− b
f
i
2
(
dˆi − wˆi + ri +
∑
j 6=i
κi,j − Λi
)2
+
∑
j 6=i
(λ0i→j)+E
[ (∆j − rj)+ +A0j + Λj
B0j
]
− b
0
i
2
E
[(
(∆i − ri)+ + Λi
)2]
+ E
[
(∆i − ri)+ 1
B0i
(
(∆i − ri)+ +A0i + Λi
)]
− a0iE
[
(∆i − ri)+ + Λi
]
+ E
[
(Λi −
∑
j 6=i
(λ0i→j)+)
(∆i − ri)+ +A0i + Λi
B0i
]
We suppose that there exists a j in {1, ..., N} such that λ0i→j > 0 (meaning
that market i is exporting to market j). We compute the derivative of Πi with
respect to λ0i→j :
∂Πi
∂λ0i→j
= −
∑
k
(
dˆk − wˆk + rk
)
+Af
Bf︸ ︷︷ ︸
pf
+ afi + b
f
i
(∑
k 6=i
κi,k − Λi + dˆi − wˆi + ri
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cfi (s
f
i )
− 1
B0j
λ0i→j + E
[
p0j
]
+
1
B0i
(
Λi −
∑
k 6=i
(λi→k)+ + E
[
(∆i − ri)+
])
− a0i
− b0iE
[
(∆i − ri)+ + Λi
]
We observe that the first line of the above equation vanishes since, by assump-
tion, pf = cfi (s
f
i ). Furthermore, since E
[
p0j
]
= 1
B0j
E
[
(∆j − rj)+
]
+ c0j (Λj) and
after a few simplifications, we obtain: ∂Πi
∂λ0i→j
= − 1
B0j
λ0i→j +
1
B0j
E
[
(∆j − rj)+
]
+
c0j (Λj)− c0i (Λ+i )− a0i . Then:
∂Πi
∂λ0i→j
= 0 ⇔ λ0i→j = B0j
[
c0j (Λj)− c0i (Λ+i )
]
+ E
[
(∆j − rj)+
]
(6)
Summing λ0i→j over all the j such that λ
0
i→j > 0 i.e., {j|p0i < p0j}, we obtain:
Λ+i =
∑
j|p0i<p0j
(
B0j
[
c0j (Λj)− c0i (Λ+i )
]
+ E
[
(∆j − rj)+
])
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Separating the equation in Λ+i we obtain:
Λ+i =
1
1 + b0i
∑
j|p0i<p0j B
0
j
{ ∑
j|p0i<p0j
(
Bjc
0
j (Λj) + E
[
(∆j − rj)+
])
− a0i
∑
j|p0i<p0j
B0j
}
(7)
By substitution of Equation (7) in Equation (6), we obtain:
λ0i→j = B
0
j
[
c0j (Λj)− c0i
( 1
1 + b0i
∑
k|p0i<p0k B
0
k
{ ∑
k|p0i<p0k
(Bkc
0
k(Λk)
+ E[(∆k − rk)+])− a0i
∑
k|p0i<p0k
B0k
})]
+ E
[
(∆j − rj)+
]
This means that λ0i→j can be expressed exclusively as a linear function of Λj ,
rj ,
(
E[(∆k − rk)+]
)
k|p0i<p0k
and E[(∆j − rj)+]. But, we proved in Proposition 3
that there exists a linear function ϕj : RN+ → R such that Λj = ϕj(rj , r−j). As
a result, at the optimum, λ0i→j can be expressed as a linear function in rj , r−j,(
E[(∆k − rk)+]
)
k|p0i<p0k
and E[(∆j − rj)+].
4.3.2 Minimization of the suppliers’ expected cost
We determined the analytical expressions of the endogenous coupling price for
the integrated day-ahead market in Subsection 4.1 and of the endogenous prices
for the split markets in real time in Subsection 4.2. Substituting these values in
the suppliers’ expected costs and using Proposition 3, each market i supplier de-
termines independently and simultaneously the quantity of energy to purchase,
qfi , or, equivalently, its position, ri, so as to minimize its expected procurement
cost, as described in optimization Program 3.
Market i supplier determines the best answer, rBAi (r−i), which minimizes
its expected procurement cost. The decentralized program output is a Nash
Equilibrium, (r∗i )i=1,...,N , defined by: r
∗
i = r
BA
i (r
∗
−i),∀i = 1, ..., N.
Proposition 5. If market i energy balance is high enough (i.e., Λi >
(
p˜0iB
0
i −
A0i
)
), there exists a positive Nash Equilibrium solution of Program 3. Other-
wise, the result still holds provided the standard deviation of ∆i is smaller than
1√
2pi
[∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j−
(
p˜0iB
0
i−A0i
)
1
2
(
1
Bfb
f
i
−3
)
− 2B
0
i
Bf
]
.
Proof of Proposition 5. It is provided in Appendix.
Using the methodology described in Proposition 5 proof, market i determines
the best answer: r∗i = r
BA
i (r
∗
−i) which minimizes its expected cost. Going a
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step further in the computations detailed in the proof of Proposition 5, we
prove that this best answer is obtained as the solution of a fixed point equation:
F¯∆i(r
∗
i ) = B
0
i
{
A0i +
(
1
Bf bfi
− 1
)(
dˆi − wˆi + p˜0iB0i + r∗i
)
+ 1
Bf bfi
∑
j 6=i
(
dˆj −
wˆj + r
∗
j
)
+
∑
j 6=i κi,j − 1bfi
(
afi − A
f
Bf
)
− 2r∗i
}−1[∑j (dˆj−wˆj)+∑j 6=i r∗j+r∗i+Af
Bf
+
dˆi−wˆi+r∗i
Bf
− p˜0i +
(
1
Bf bfi
+ 1
)
σ∆i
B0i
√
2pi
exp
(
− (r∗i )2
2σ2∆i
)]
. This fixed point equation
is solved simultaneously by all markets. Nash Equilibria are obtained at the
intersections of the best answers.
To show uniqueness of the resulting Nash Equilibrium, we apply the con-
traction mapping approach. As shown in Bertsekas [2], it is sufficient to check
that the Hessian of the expected cost functions fulfills the diagonal dominance
condition i.e.,
∑
j 6=i | ∂
2Ui
∂ri∂rj
| < |∂2Ui
∂r2i
|,∀i = 1, ..., N. We show, below, that the
uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium heavily relies on the number of geographic
demand markets:
Proposition 6. We assume that market i energy balance is high enough (i.e.,
Λi >
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
). If there are less or exactly three geographic demand markets
then there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium solution of Program 3.
Proof of Proposition 6. The assumption that Λi >
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
guarantees
that Proposition 5 holds. Derivating first Ui with respect to ri and then, a
second time, with respect to rj , j 6= i, we obtain: ∂2Ui∂ri∂rj = 1Bf +
b0i
bfi B
f
F¯∆i(ri) >
0. We remind that, by definition, Bfbfi > 1,∀i = 1, ..., N. The assumption that
Λi >
(
p˜0iB
0
i − A0i
)
implies, according to Proposition 5: ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
−∑j 6=i ∂2Ui∂ri∂rj =
1
Bf
(3−N)+b0i (3− Nbfi Bf )F¯∆i(ri)+
Λi−
(
p˜0iB
0
i−A0i )
)
B0i
f∆i(ri) >
1
Bf
(3−N)+b0i (3−
N)F¯∆i(ri) +
Λi −
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
B0i
f∆i(ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,∀i = 1, ..., N. Then, it is sufficient to
have 1
Bf
(3 − N) + b0i (3 − N)F¯∆i(ri) > 0 ⇔ (3 − N)
[ 1
Bf
+ b0i F¯∆i(ri)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 to
guarantee that the diagonal dominance condition holds. We conclude that if
N ≤ 3 then diagonal dominance is checked.
We have proved in Propositions 5 and 6 that for less or exactly three ge-
ographic demand markets, there exist parameter values guaranteeing the exis-
tence of a unique Nash Equilibrium solution of the Signaling Game described in
Section 2.2. There is no guarantee about the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium
for N > 3. From a policy perspective, the existence of multiple Nash Equilibria
implies that the outcome of the Market Design cannot be predicted. Compu-
tationally, multiple Nash Equilibria imply that the output of the model may
depend on the initial conditions of the algorithm.
19
5 Wind farm portfolio optimization under di-
rect participation of wind generator to the
market
When wind farm investor participates directly in an electricity market i.e., with-
out subsidy-based supporting schemes, it influences the day-ahead positions, by
putting wind in the system. In the following section, excess wind is not reim-
bursed anymore, leading to p˜0i = 0,∀i = 1, ..., N . We assume that the investment
strategy in renewable capacity is defined over a finite horizon 0 < T < +∞.
In this setting, the Signaling Game described in Section 4.3 is repeated over a
finite horizon T .
There can be significant year-to-year variations in wind conditions, which
would have an impact on profitability, and these may differ between regions [9].
Furthermore, the higher the terrain complexity, the lower the wind predictabil-
ity. We assume that each market i is clusterized in a subset Ci of clusters where,
over c ∈ Ci, the estimated demand dˆi(c) and the wind mean production αi(c)
are supposed constant and such that at each time period t:
di(c, t) = dˆi(c)− νi(c, t) (8)
wi(c, t) = wˆi(c)− i(c, t) (9)
We assume that the geographic market i clusters are defined so that there
is no correlation among the cluster forecast errors because correlation among
wind farms decreases with the distance [7] but that, inside each cluster, there
remains a positive correlation between the wind production and the demand
forecast error. Making the parallel with the previous notations, we have: di(t) =∑
c∈Ci di(c, t) and αi =
∑
c∈Ci αi(c). Clustering may be performed through
one of the automatic partitioning algorithms used in Machine Learning [12], as
illustrated for Germany in Section 6.
We let ∆i(c, t) be the difference between the wind power supply and the
demand forecast errors in market i cluster c, at time period t. Transpos-
ing Subsection 2.3 assumptions to a finer scale (i.e., clusters instead of geo-
graphic markets), we assume that
(
∆i(c, t)
)
c∈Ci
is distributed according to a
|Ci|-dimensional Gaussian density function centered in the zero |Ci|-dimensional
vector and with a diagonal variance-covariance matrix having on its principal
diagonal all the variances
(
σ∆i(c)
)2
,∀c ∈ Ci and zeros everywhere else since
the covariance between any ∆i(c, t),∆i(c
′, t),∀c, c′ ∈ Ci, c 6= c′ vanishes. Fur-
thermore, over each cluster c ∈ Ci, the wind production and the demand fore-
cast errors are correlated due to the assumption that
(
˜i(c, t) νi(c, t)
)T
is a
Gaussian random vector centered in
(
0
0
)
and of variance-covariance matrix
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
(
σ˜i (c)
)2
E
[
˜i(c, t)νi(c, t)
]
E
[
˜i(c, t)νi(c, t)
] (
σνi (c)
)2
 .
Modern Portfolio Theory is an alternative to the traditional method of ana-
lyzing each investment’s individual merits. When investors look at each invest-
ment’s individual merits, they are analyzing one investment without worrying
about the way the different investments will perform relative to each other. On
the other hand, Modern Portfolio Theory places a large emphasis on the cor-
relation between the investments. Markowitz defines as efficient the portfolios
which are characterized by a maximum expected revenue for a fixed risk (or,
equivalently, for a minimum risk for a fixed expected revenue) [17]. Risk and
volatility are treated as the same thing: Markowitz uses risk as a measurement
of the likelihood that an investment still goes up and down in value, and how
often and by how much. The theory assumes that investors prefer to minimize
risk. The Efficient Frontier, also called the Markowitz Frontier (MF), is then
defined as the set of all the portfolios which are efficient. In this article, the
supplier applies Modern Portfolio Theory to determine the wind farm portfolio
that minimizes its expected investment while minimizing its risk conditionally
to the occurrence of rare events [18] caused by discrepancies between forecasts
and realizations. Note that since wind generator directly participates to the
market and excess wind is curtailed, only under-supply is considered as a rare
event.
In the numerical illustrations we will test two assumptions on the construc-
tion cost function for the wind farm portfolio on the cluster c ∈ Ci: either it
is linear in the number of wind farms: Ξ
(
γi(c)
)
= ξγi(c) or it is quadratic:
Ξ
(
γi(c)
)
= ξγi(c)
2 with ξ > 0 representing the construction cost for a single
wind farm.
5.1 In the
(
γi(c), θi(c)
)
plane
In this subsection, we characterize analytically the MF in the
(
γi(c), θi(c)
)
plane. Theorem 7, described below, states that the optimal concentration of
the wind farms θi(c) in cluster c ∈ Ci is obtained as the unique output of an
explicit function of the number of wind farms γi(c), provided γi(c) satisfies the
conditions of the second and third equations introduced in the Theorem. This
is a strong result as we prove that the form of this explicit function is identical
for MD 1 and MD 2. It is worth mentioning that Theorem 7 does not define a
unique optimal portfolio but, in fact, a multiplicity of solutions.
Theorem 7. Whatever the Market Design (i.e., two tiered with exogenous
prices, two tiered with endogenous prices), the Markowitz Frontier in the
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(
γi(c), θi(c)
)
plane is completely described by the following set of equations:
θi(c) =
ln
E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(
σ˜i(c)
)2
ln γi(c)
E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(
σ˜i
(c)
)2 ≤ γi(c) ≤ (E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(σ˜i
(c))2
)2
γi(c) ∈ N∗
Proof of Theorem 7. When optimizing its wind farm portfolio, market i
supplier’s problem is to determine the optimal number of wind farms γi(c) ∈ N∗
and their concentration 12 ≤ θi(c) ≤ 1, over each cluster c ∈ Ci, such that its
expected investment is minimal and the variance of its investment conditionally
to the occurrence of rare events is minimal.
MD 1: Over each geographic demand market i = 1, ..., N , the supplier
investment function is defined as the sum of the cost resulting from its con-
ventional energy demand, repeated T times, and of the cost devoted to the
construction of the wind farm portfolio:
I(i, T ) =
∑
t
(
qfi (t)p
f (t) + q0i (t)p
0(t)
)
+
∑
c∈Ci
Ξ
(
γi(c)
)
=
∑
t
(∑
c∈Ci
(dˆi(c)− αi(c)γi(c)) + ri(t)
)
pf (t)
+
∑
t
[(∑
c∈Ci
(
˜i(c, t)γi(c)
θi(c) − νi(c, t)
)
− ri(t)
)
+
p0i (t)
]
+
∑
c∈Ci
Ξ
(
γi(c)
)
=
∑
t
(∑
c∈Ci
(dˆi(c)− αi(c)γi(c)) + ri(t)
)
pf (t) +
∑
t
(
∆i(t)− ri(t)
)
+
p0i (t)
+
∑
c∈Ci
Ξ(γi(c))
where, we recall: ∆i(t) =
∑
c∈Ci
(
i(c, t)− νi(c, t)
)
=
∑
c∈Ci
(
γi(c)
θi(c)˜i(c, t)−
νi(c, t)
)
. We obtain quite easily the analytical expression of the variance of ∆i:
σ2∆i =
∑
c∈Ci
σ2∆i(c) =
∑
c∈Ci
V ar
(
i(c)− νi(c)
)
=
∑
c∈Ci
V ar
(
γi(c)
θi(c)˜i(c)− νi(c)
)
=
∑
c∈Ci
{(
σ˜i
(c)
)2
γi(c)
2θi(c) − 2γi(c)θi(c)E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
+ σνi (c)
2
}
(10)
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Then, we compute the supplier’s risk i.e., the variance of its investment
conditionally to the occurrence of rare events: V ar
(
I(i, T )|
{
∆i(t) ≥ ri(t)
}
t
)
=
V ar
(∑
t ∆i(t)p
0
i (t)−
∑
t
(
ri(t)p
0
i (t)+
∑
c∈Ci
(
dˆi(c)−αi(c)γi(c)+ri(t)
)
pf (t)
)
+∑
c∈Ci Ξ
(
γi(c)
))
. We note that it is only the first term of this equation that
depends on ∆i(t). Using properties of the variance operator (i.e., variance of a
constant equals zero, variance is a quadratic operator) and the fact that there is
no dependence between two time consecutive forecast error differences, we infer
that:
V ar
(
I(i, T )|
{
∆i(t) ≥ ri(t)
}
t
)
=
∑
c∈Ci
σ2∆i(c)
∑
t
p0i (t)
2
=
∑
c∈Ci
[(
σ˜i
(c)
)2
γi(c)
2θi(c) − 2γi(c)θi(c)E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
+ σνi (c)
2
]∑
t
p0i (t)
2
using Equation (10). In the rest of the article, we let:
RV ar(i, T ) , V ar
(
I(i, T )|
{
∆i(t) ≥ ri(t)
}
t
)
be the risk of market i supplier.
The expectation of the supplier’s investment is:
E[I(i, T )] =
∑
t
(∑
c∈Ci
dˆi(c) + F¯
−1
∆i
(pf (t)
p0i (t)
))
pf (t)−
∑
t
(∑
c∈Ci
αi(c)γi(c)
)
pf (t)
+
∑
t
p0i (t)E
[(
∆i(t)− F¯−1∆i (
pf (t)
p0i (t)
)
)
+
]
+
∑
c∈Ci
Ξ(γi(c))
Derivating RV ar(i, T ) with respect to θi(c) and solving
∂RV ar(i,T )
∂θi(c)
= 0,
we obtain: θi(c) =
ln
E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(
σ˜i
(c)
)2
ln γi(c)
. But: 12 ≤ θi(c) ≤ 1 which is equivalent
to
E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(
σ˜i(c)
)2 ≤ γi(c) ≤ (E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(
σ˜i(c)
)2 )2. Using the fact that E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]
(
σ˜i(c)
)2 ≤
γi(c), we check that θi(c) coincides with a minimum for RV ar(i, T ) indeed:
∂2RV ar(i,T )
∂θi(c)2
= 2γi(c)
θi(c) ln(γi(c))
2
[
2
(
σ˜i
(c)
)2
γi(c)− E
[
˜i(c)νi(c)
]]
> 0.
MD 2: In Equations (8) and (9), dˆi(c) and wˆi(c) do not dependent on time.
This implies that in the algorithms described in Subsection 4.3, the optimal
positions are also independent on time; contrary to MD 1, where the optimal
positions are functions of the day-ahead and real-time price ratio, which is time
dependent. Using this observation, we infer that the day-ahead price is time
independent; indeed: pf =
∑
j
(
dˆj−wˆj+rj
)
+Af
Bf
.
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In case of endogenous prices, market i supplier investment takes the following
form:
I(i, T ) =
∑
t
(∑
c∈Ci
(
dˆi(c)− wˆi(c)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dˆi−wˆi
+ri
)
pf (t) +
∑
t
[(∑
c∈Ci
(
˜i(c, t)γi(c)
θi(c) − νi(c, t)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆i(t)
− ri
)
+
p0i (t)
]
+
∑
c∈Ci
Ξ
(
γi(c)
)
(11)
Compared to MD 1, we observe one additional difficulty: at the optimum ri
relies on r−i and the bilateral trades rely on the decisions of the other markets.
Market i supplier’s risk is similar to the one derived for MD 1:
RV ar(i, T ) = V ar
(
I(i, T )|
{
∆i(t) ≥ ri
}
t
)
= σ2∆i
∑
t
p0i (t)
2 (12)
Therefore, the same result holds about the optimal wind farm concentration.
In MD 1 and MD 2, the MF is completely described by the set of equations
summarized in the statement of Theorem 7.
5.2 In the
(
E
[
I(i, T )
]
, RV ar(i, T )
)
plane
The representation of the MF in the
(
E[I(i, T )], RV ar(i, T )
)
plane is not straight-
forward. Indeed, in case of endogenous prices, the optimal number of wind farms
to construct in each cluster cannot be computed analytically. The optimal po-
sitions and the optimal bilateral trades can only be obtained algorithmically, as
explained in Section 4.3.
In each cluster c ∈ Ci, the supplier can construct a fixed number of wind
farms γi(c). For each combination of
(
γi(c)
)
i,c
, we derive the optimal wind
farm portfolio concentration
(
θi(c)
)
i,c
using Theorem 7. We substitute the
resulting
(
γi(c), θi(c)
)
i,c
in (σ∆i)i as derived in Equation (10) and in the Nash
Equilibrium in the positions and bilateral trades (r∗i ,Λ
∗
i )i obtained through the
algorithm detailed in Section (4.3).
We substitute (r∗i ,Λ
∗
i )i and
(
∆i(t)
)
i
in the real time price:
p0i (t) =
A0i+
(
∆i(t)−r∗i
)
+
+Λ∗i
B0i
,∀i = 1, ..., N derived in Subsection 4.2. From this,
we can infer the supplier’s risk using Equation (12).
At the same time, we note that the expectation of market i supplier invest-
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ment can be simplified to give:
E
[
I(i, T )
]
=
T
Bf
(
dˆi − wˆi + ri
){∑
j
(
dˆj − wˆj + rj
)
+Af
}
+
T
B0i
{
A0i
+ ϕi(ri, r−i)
}
E
[(
∆i(t)− ri
)
+
]
+
T
B0i
E
[(
∆i(t)− ri
)2
+
]
+
∑
c∈Ci
Ξ
(
γi(c)
)
where, as detailed in Appendix: E
[(
∆i(t) − ri
)
+
]
= E
[(
∆i(t) − ri
)
|{∆i(t) ≥
ri}
]
=
σ∆i√
2pi
exp(− r2i
2σ2∆i
)−riF¯∆i(ri) and E
[(
∆i(t)−ri
)2
+
]
= E
[
(∆i(t)−ri)2|{∆i(t) ≥
ri}
]
=
σ2∆i√
pi
Γ( 32 )Γinc(
3
2 ,
r2i
2σ2∆i
) − σ∆i√
2pi
exp(− r2i
2σ2∆i
) + r2i with Γ(a) the Gamma
function evaluated in a ∈ R+ and Γinc(a, x) = 1Γ(a)
∫ +∞
x
ua−1exp(−u)du the
Incomplete Gamma function with lower bound, evaluated in a, x ∈ R+.
6 Numerical illustrations for three geographic
demand markets: France, Germany and Bel-
gium
In the numerical illustrations, we consider three geographic demand markets:
France, Germany and Belgium. Wind farm portfolio optimization is restricted
to the French area, since our energy consumption data focus on this country.
The marginal cost parameters are based on Chao and Peck’s six node toy
network [5]: for France (Fr) we take afFr = 42.5, a
0
Fr = 4250, b
f
Fr = b
0
Fr = 0.025;
for Germany (Ge) we take afGe = 15, a
0
Ge = 1500, b
f
Ge = b
0
Ge = 0.05 and for
Belgium (Be) afBe = 10, a
0
Be = 1000, b
f
Be = b
0
Be = 0.05.
The equivalent interconnection capacities are set so that: κBe,Ge = 2(GW ),
κBe,Fr = 6(GW ) and κGe,Fr = 5(GW ).
6.1 Description of the data and clustering of the geo-
graphic demand markets
For Germany, our database is made of time series of 75 sensors located all
over Germany, providing one year wind speed measures (from 03/19/2013 until
03/18/2014) with one measure per hour [32]. The exact GPS coordinates of the
sensors are depicted by circles in Figure 2 (a). We use two Machine Learning
techniques to partition the sensors based on the mean and variance of their wind
speed time series: firstly, k-Means algorithm clusters data by separating samples
in an a priori determined number of groups, minimizing a criterion known as the
inertia of the groups. The optimal number of classes for the sensors (4) has been
estimated a priori using an unsupervized clustering method known as affinity
propagation [35]. Secondly, one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) can be
used as a type of unsupervised learning algorithm, for novelty detection: given
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a set of samples, it will detect the soft boundary of that set so as to classify
new points as belonging to that set or not. Both techniques give identical (or,
at least, very close) classes, which are represented in Figure 2 (a) and (b).
The convex hull of the sensor classes gives an approximation to the clusters
geographic area for Germany.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2: Partitioning Germany wind speed sensors, using a Machine Learning au-
tomatic partitioning algorithm (k-Means or SVM outlier detection) (a). The sensors’
locations in GPS coordinates are represented in (a) by circles. In (b) and (c), the sen-
sors are represented in the Mean-Variance plane depending on their wind speed time
series mean and variance. We partition Germany and France’s wind speed sensors in
(b) and (c) respectively; each marker symbol being associated with a specific class.
For France and Belgium, we use data provided by the Me´te´ociel platform
[33] for the year 2013. Each country is clusterized using one of the automatic
partitioning tools, described above for Germany, applied on the historical wind
speed measurements. We infer that France (resp. Belgium) can be partitioned
in 8 (resp. 2) clusters, as represented in Figure 2 (c) for France. The geographic
coordinates of the cluster areas can be found in [3]. We associate an index with
each French cluster area. The wind power production at the various points in
the clusters are then inferred from the wind speed measurements using the Betz
limit10. Finally, over each cluster, the wind power productions are averaged.
10Source for Betz limit: http://www.wind-power-program.com/betz.htm
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The mean and standard deviations are then calculated on the basis of each
cluster average time series of wind power production. We consider a constant
average and standard deviation for wind power production throughout the time
horizon.
Estimated wind production for Germany and Belgium is fixed so that: wˆGe =
15(GW ) and wˆBe = 10(GW ). The forecast error difference standard deviations
are set so that: σ∆Be = σ∆Ge = 5(GW ). For France, if 10 turbines were placed
in each cluster, wˆFr = 4.97(GW ) and the forecast error difference standard
deviation would be: σ∆Fr = 5.79(GW ).
Figure 3: Energy consumption empirical distribution function (in kWh) compared to
the best fit Gaussian density function for PACA region.
For estimating the variance associated to the demand forecast, we use a data
base containing one year (2013) power measurements (in kW) for each French
region, with a granularity of one measure per 30 minutes [34]. The French re-
gions are then mapped to the French clusters, as defined in RTE report [3].
Then, over each cluster, we take the average of these time series to obtain one
value per day. In Figure 3, we compare the empirical distribution function of
one French cluster (PACA region) energy consumption with the best fit Gaus-
sian density function. This comparison validates our assumptions on demand
forecasting, captured in Equation (8).
For France, the end users’ total demand is estimated by: dˆFr = 56.173(GW );
for Germany and Belgium we fix: dˆGe = dˆBe = 40(GW ).
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Clust.
ind.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Mean
conso.
19.890 6.043 2.480 2.947 9.104 4.875 3.736 7.098
Conso.
stand.
dev.
5.048 1.196 0.496 0.654 2.010 1.032 0.953 1.874
Table 1: Mean consumption (GW) and consumption standard deviation per French
cluster (GW).
6.2 Optimal forward positions and Markowitz Frontier
representations for France
In Figure 4 (a), we plot market i optimal position for the two tiered market
with exogenous prices (MD 1) described in Section 3 as a function of the ex-
ogenous price ratio
p0Fr
pf
and of the forecast error standard deviation σ∆Fr . In
Figure 4 (b), we plot the optimal position for the two tiered market with endoge-
nous prices (MD 2) and positions described in Section 4 as a function of the wind
forecast wˆFr and of the forecast error standard deviation σ∆Fr . The endogenous
prices corresponding to the interval of variation of wˆi and σ∆i are such that p
f
belongs to the interval [0; 95; 1.30] and p0 to the interval [3.52; 4.16]. For the
exogenous prices, we choose p0 = 4 which is close to the center of the interval
of variation of the real-time endogenous price. The day-ahead endogenous price
then varies in the interval [0.15; 1.35]. The endogenous and exogenous prices are
now in the same range of values. We observe that in case of exogenous prices,
p0
pf
weakly impacts the optimal position whereas σ∆i clearly makes the position
increase; in case of endogenous prices, both wˆi and σ∆i make the position in-
crease. Reciprocally, the increase of the position makes p
0
pf
decrease in case of
endogenous prices whereas it has only a threshold effect in case of exogenous
prices.
In Figure 5, we plot the MF for the wind farm portfolio over each French
cluster as a function of the number of turbines and of the concentration of the
wind farms over the cluster. These plots are issued from the theoretical relation
derived in Theorem 7.
We assume that the supplier can construct 0, 60 or 120 turbines over each
cluster leading to 38 combinations for France. This choice of numerical values
is justified by the fact that largest US wind farms nowadays have around 600
turbines11 and by coming down on the scale of France. Assuming that a wind
farm counts on the average 60 turbines, the supplier has the choice between
constructing 0, 1 or 2 wind farms per cluster. We observe in Figure 6 that
the value of ξ and the form of the investment cost (i.e., linear, quadratic, etc.)
11For example, the Roscoe wind farm in Roscoe, Texas, is one of the world’s largest capacity
wind farms with 634 turbines and a total installed capacity of 781.5 MW.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: In (a) (resp. (b)), we represent the optimal position ri in case of exogenous
prices (resp. endogenous prices) as a function of the forecast error difference standard
deviation σ∆i and of the exogenous price ratio (
p0
pf
) (resp. of the wind forecast wˆi).
Figure 5: Over each French cluster, the Markowitz Frontier for the wind farm portfolio
is represented as a function of the number of turbines and of the concentration between
the wind farms over the cluster. Each of the 8 French clusters is characterized by a
specific color.
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deeply influence the MF shape.
Figure 6: Markowitz Frontier (MF) in red in the
(E[I(Fr,T )]
T
, RV ar(Fr, T )1/2
)
plane.
In (a), we represent all the portfolio combinations and the MF for ξ
T
= 1 and a linear
cost of construction. In (b), we plot all the portfolio combinations and the MF for
ξ
T
= 900 and a linear cost of construction. In (c), the same setting holds but we select
exclusively the portfolios associated with two construction costs:
∑
c∈CFr
Ξ
(
γFr(c)
)
T
=
24.103 and 36.103. In (d), we plot the portfolio combinations and the MF for ξ
T
= 1
and a quadratic cost of construction.
7 Conclusion
We considered a stylized network model representing a certain number of geo-
graphic demand markets and assumed rational expectation of the agents. The
originality of our work relies on the introduction of competition among the ge-
ographic demand markets and of our choice to model the agent interactions
as a Signaling Game. In each geographic demand market, supplier optimizes
selfishly its day-ahead position which acts as a signal for the generators which
optimize their bilateral trades with the other markets. We proved analytically
that firstly, there exist conditions guaranteeing the existence and the unique-
ness of a Nash Equilibrium for less or exactly three geographic demand markets
and secondly, that the set of efficient wind farm portfolios can be expressed as
a function of the number of constructed wind farms and of their concentration
independently of the Market Design. Finally, we simulated, on a real case study,
the contour of the Markowitz Frontier in the expected investment-risk plane.
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The linearity of the cost functions, the inelasticity of demand and day-ahead
Market Coupling are necessary assumptions in our analysis. The relaxation of
these assumptions is an interesting direction of future research but will lead us
to the limits of analytical tractability.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
By substitution of the day-ahead and real-time prices at equilibrium obtained
in Lemmas 1 and 2 in market i expected procurement cost, we obtain:
Ui = q
f
i
∑
j q
f
j +A
f
Bf
+ E
[ (q0i )2
B0i
+
A0i +
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
B0i
q0i − p˜0i q˜0i
]
Using Proposition 3 and the fact that E
[
q0i
]
= E
[
(∆i − ri)+
]
= E
[
(∆i −
ri)|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
and E
[
q˜0i
]
= E
[
(∆i − ri)−
]
= E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≤ ri}
]
, we
obtain:
∂Ui
∂ri
=
∑
j q
f
j +A
f
Bf
+
qfi
Bf
+
∂
∂ri
( 1
B0i
E
[
(∆i − ri)2|{∆i ≥ ri}
])
+
A0i +
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
B0i
∂
∂ri
E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
+ b0i (
1
Bfbfi
− 1)E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
− p˜0i
∂
∂ri
E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≤ ri}
]
Since the forecast error differences ∆i are distributed according to Gaussian
distribution functions centered in 0 and of standard deviation σ∆i , it is possible
to express the first and second derivatives of (∆i−ri) and (∆i−ri)2 conditionally
to the event {∆i ≥ ri} as functions of the Incomplete Gamma function which
enables us to derive the following closed forms:
E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
=
∫ +∞
ri
∆f∆i(∆)d∆− ri
∫ +∞
ri
f∆i(∆)d∆
=
σ∆i√
2pi
exp(− r
2
i
2σ2∆i
)− riF¯∆i(ri)
∂
∂ri
E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
= −F¯∆i(ri)
∂2
∂r2i
E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
= f∆i(ri) (13)
and
E
[
(∆i − ri)2|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
=
∫ +∞
ri
∆2f∆i(∆)d∆− 2ri
∫ +∞
ri
∆f∆i(∆)d∆
+ r2i
∫ +∞
ri
f∆i(∆)d∆
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∂∂ri
E
[
(∆i − ri)2|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
= 2[ri
∫ +∞
ri
f∆i(∆)d∆−
∫ +∞
ri
∆f∆i(∆)d∆]
∂2
∂r2i
E
[
(∆i − ri)2|{∆i ≥ ri}
]
= 2F¯∆i(ri) (14)
Using the same principle, we obtain:
∂
∂ri
E
[
(∆i − ri)|{∆i ≤ ri}
]
= F∆i(ri) (15)
Using Equations (13), (14) and (15), we obtain:
∂2Ui
∂r2i
=
2
Bf
+ b0i
(
3− 1
Bfbfi
)
F¯∆i(ri) +
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j −
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
B0i
f∆i(ri)
Since F¯∆i(ri) > 0 and f∆i(ri) > 0 for any ri ∈ R, Bfbfi > 1 by definition
and Bf > 0, B0i > 0, the sign of
∂2Ui
∂r2i
for ri ∈ [0; +∞[ depends on the sign of∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j−
(
p˜0iB
0
i−A0i
)
B0i
. Two cases are possible:
Case 1:
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j−
(
p˜0iB
0
i−A0i
)
B0i
≥ 0⇔∑j 6=i λ0i→j ≥ (p˜0iB0i −A0i)
This first case corresponds to the case where the quantity of imports is not
too high compared to the quantity of exports, for market i. In this first case,
we infer that ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
> 0,∀ri ≥ 0. Hence Ui is convex in ri ≥ 0. Therefore, there
exists a unique ri ≥ 0 minimizing Ui.
Case 2:
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j−
(
p˜0iB
0
i−A0i
)
B0i
< 0⇔∑j 6=i λ0i→j < (p˜0iB0i −A0i)
This second case corresponds to the case where the quantity of imports is
high compared to the quantity of exports, for geographic market i.
Derivating three times Ui with respect to ri, we obtain:
∂3Ui
∂r3i
= −b0i
(
3− 1
Bfbfi
)
f∆i(ri)−
(
A0i −B0i p˜0i
)
+
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
B0i
ri
σ2∆i
f∆i(ri)
= −f∆i(ri)
B0i
1
σ2∆i
[(
3− 1
Bfbfi
)
σ2∆i + ri
((
A0i −B0i p˜0i
)
+
∑
j 6=i
λ0i→j
)]
using the fact that
df∆i (ri)
dri
= − ri
σ2∆i
f∆i(ri),∀ri ∈ R since ∆i is distributed
according to a Gaussian distribution function centered in 0 and of standard
deviation σ∆i . Then:
∂3Ui
∂r3i
= 0⇔ ri = −
(
3− 1
Bfb
f
i
)
σ2∆i(
A0i−B0i p˜0i
)
+
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
.
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We set: r0i , −
(
3− 1
Bfb
f
i
)
σ2∆i(
A0i−B0i p˜0i
)
+
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
. Then, we note that:
• If ri < r0i then ri < −
(
3− 1
Bfb
f
i
)
σ2∆i(
A0i−B0i p˜0i
)
+
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
⇔
(
3− 1
Bf bfi
)
σ2∆i +ri
((
A0i −
B0i p˜
0
i
)
+
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j
)
> 0. This implies in turn that ∂
3Ui
∂r3i
< 0.
• Identically, if ri > r0i then ∂
3Ui
∂r3i
> 0.
Both of these observations imply that ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
is decreasing on [0; r0i [ and increasing
on [r0i ; +∞[. Furthermore, the number of points where ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
= 0 depend on the
value of ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=r0i .
Case 2 (a): ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=r0i > 0
Then ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
> 0,∀ri ≥ 0. This implies that Ui is convex on R+. Therefore
it admits a unique minimum on [0; +∞[.
Case 2 (b): ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=r0i < 0
Then two sub-cases should be distinguished depending on the sign of
∂2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=0.
Case 2 (b) (i): ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=0 < 0 There exists a unique r1i ∈ [r0i ; +∞[
such that ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
< 0 on [0; r1i [ and
∂2Ui
∂r2i
≥ 0 on [r1i ; +∞[. This implies
that ∂Ui∂ri is decreasing on [0; r
1
i [ and increasing on [r
1
i ; +∞[. Hence
∂Ui
∂ri
= 0 in 0, 1 or 2 points for ri ≥ 0. Then: either ∂Ui∂ri |ri=r1i > 0
which implies that Ui is strictly increasing on R+ reaching its min-
imum in ri = 0 ; or there exists a point r
∗
i ∈ [r1i ; +∞[ such that
∂Ui
∂ri
|ri=r∗i = 0. Since ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
> 0 on [r1i ; +∞[ only, this implies that r∗i
is the unique minimum of Ui on R+.
Case 2 (b) (ii): ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=0 > 0 There exist 0 ≤ r2i ≤ r0i and r0i ≤ r3i
such that ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
> 0 on [0; r2i [, < 0 on [r
2
i ; r
3
i [ and > 0 on [r
3
i ; +∞[.
If ∂Ui∂ri |ri=0 ≥ 0 then there exists a unique r∗i ∈ [r3i ; +∞[ such
that ∂Ui∂ri |ri=r∗i = 0 and ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=r∗i > 0. In this case, r∗i is the
unique minimum of Ui over R+.
Otherwise i.e., if ∂Ui∂ri |ri=0 < 0 then: either ∂Ui∂ri |ri=r2i < 0 in
which case Ui admits a unique minimum over R+ belonging to
[r3i ; +∞[ ; or ∂Ui∂ri |ri=r2i ≥ 0 in which case Ui admits two minima
over R+, the first one in [0; r2i [ and the second one in [r3i ; +∞[.
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The case ∂
2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=0 > 0 should be avoided since it might give rise to a
large number of equilibria (2N ) for Program 3. Therefore, in the case where∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j <
(
p˜0iB
0
i − A0i
)
, it might be reasonable to impose some conditions
on the problem parameters so that Case 2 (b) (ii) is avoided. In other words:
∂2Ui
∂r2i
|ri=0 =
2
Bf
+
1
2B0i
(
3− 1
Bfbfi
)
+
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j −
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
B0i
f∆i(0) < 0
⇔ f∆i(0) > −
2B0i
Bf
+ 12
(
3− 1
Bf bfi
)
∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j −
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
⇔ σ∆i < −
1√
2pi
[∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j −
(
p˜0iB
0
i −A0i
)
2B0i
Bf
+ 12
(
3− 1
Bf bfi
) ]
Therefore, to avoid Case 2 (b) (ii), the standard-deviation related to the knowl-
edge of ∆i should be smaller than
1√
2pi
[∑
j 6=i λ
0
i→j−
(
p˜0iB
0
i−A0i
)
1
2
(
1
Bfb
f
i
−3
)
− 2B
0
i
Bf
]
.
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